Panchayati raj (New Delhi, October 1989) RAJIV GANDHI (1944–1991)

Panchayati raj (New Delhi, October 1989)
RAJIV GANDHI (1944–1991)

By pursuing in earnest the project of institutionalizing village selfgovernance
through panchayats, Rajiv Gandhi was carrying forward an idea
that was close to Mahatma Gandhi’s heart. Even though Nehru and Indira
Gandhi had not been too keen on panchayats, the process had made
significant advances in West Bengal, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan. Rajiv
Gandhi, as Prime Minister, attempted to give a national dimension to the
process. e political calculation behind it was that it would enable
Congress governments at the centre to bypass hostile state governments and
give money directly to the people. is was one of Rajiv Gandhi’s most
important political contributions and the process continues albeit at a
slower pace than what he would have liked.



MAIN SPEECH


I have been following with the closest interest this important debate on the
Panchayati Raj and Nagarpalika Bills. ese constitutional amendments,
which I had the honour to introduce at the last session, are of truly historic
and revolutionary significance. It is, therefore, not surprising that the debate
should have been sometimes stormy, sometimes incisive, sometimes
reflective, but at all times lively. I wish to thank all members on both sides
of the House for the important contributions they have made to this debate
which is bound to adorn textbooks on constitutional history for many years
to come.
By and large, it appears to me there is general acceptance of the need for
maximum democracy and maximum devolution. What is disputed is
matters of constitutional jurisdiction, political propriety, electoral
d l l d l All d d l h h f
motivation, and legislative detail. Allow me, madam, to deal with each of
these apprehensions in turn.
It has now been well established in both Houses that there can be no doubt
about the Union Government’s competence to introduce these
constitutional amendments. We have displayed the utmost rectitude in not
impinging upon the essential constitutional relationship established
between the union and the states. Our basic aim is to secure constitutional
sanctity for democracy in the panchayats and nagarpalikas and devolution to
them of adequate power and finances to ensure the people’s participation in
the development process.
First, we have left entry five of the State List exactly as it is and where it is.
e competence of state legislatures to deal with all municipal legislation
relating to rural and urban local bodies has not been tampered with in any
way. Second, care has been taken to so draft the constitutional amendments
as to leave it entirely to state legislatures to draft the law on the subject, and
state governments to formulate and pass the necessary orders to realize the
objectives of these, constitutional amendments. e only point I would wish
to stress is that all municipal law has to conform to the provisions of the
constitution. ese two amendments, when passed, will set the
constitutional stage on the basis of which state legislatures will undertake
detailed legislation…
ird, it is erroneous and misleading to say, as some members opposite have
alleged, that what we have attempted to do is to draft a detailed municipal
legislation by the back door of detailed constitutional amendments. We
have restricted ourselves to essential features such as regularity in elections
and the forestalling of arbitrary and prolonged suspensions. We have been
asked why we have prescribed in such detail a common structure of
panchayats at village, intermediate and district levels, as also a common
structure of nagarpalikas for different sizes of population. e answer is
simple. A uniform structure means uniform pattern and degree of
democratic representation in the local bodies. Why would the pattern and
degree of democracy differ from one part of the country to the other? We
are, after all, one country. Another major objective we have in mind is to
reduce the vast gap that now separates the voter from his representative. In
a vast country like ours, there are at present not more than about 5,500
persons—5,000 in the state legislatures and around 500 in Parliament—to
d l ll l  b f k h
directly represent 800 million people. e number of voters seeking the
assistance of the elected representative is so large that there is no way the
representative can really give his personal attention to his electorate as a
whole. Also, it means the people have to approach their MLA, or even MP,
to get grassroot problems attended to. e Panchayati Raj and Nagarpalika
Bills will generate so many lakhs of elected grassroot representatives that the
distance between the voters and his representative would be drastically
reduced, the power brokers would be driven from their perches and
grassroot problems would receive grassroot attention. ere is no reason
why these benefits should not reach the people in a more or less uniform
manner throughout the country. at objective can only be secured by
uniformity in the structure of local bodies.
e third point is perhaps, of the greatest significance. We are determined
to ensure just representation for the weaker sections of society through
reservations in all our local bodies. e only way of ensuring uniformity in
reservations is by ensuring a uniform structure of local government. Let me
give you an example to illustrate the complications that would have arisen if
we had tried to secure a uniform system of reservations without having a
uniform structure of local government. At present in some states including
Congress-run Maharashtra and non-Congress-run West Bengal, the
panchayat samiti is a body directly elected by the people at large. In some
other states, however, the panchayat samiti is not a directly elected body but
a committee of the Chairman of village panchayats. In a directly elected
panchayat samiti it is entirely feasible to reserve seats for scheduled castes
and scheduled tribes in proportion to their population, as also to reserve
thirty percent of the seats for women. If, however, the panchayat samiti is
not a directly elected body but only a committee of the chairman of the
village panchayats how is one to secure proportionate representation for
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes or thirty percent reservation for
women? In prescribing a uniform structure of local government, for the
country as a whole, our aim is not to arbitrarily impose a uniform structure
on a diverse country. It is only to ensure that there is uniformity of
reservations throughout the country for the scheduled castes, the scheduled
tribes and women. We are second to none in recognizing the diversity of
our country. We are second to none in celebrating the variegated cultures of
our country. We are second to none in being the most passionate advocates
of our unity in diversity, in recognizing and affirming that, in a country like
I d h l h bl b l h d f
India, the only unity that is possible is by a large hearted acceptance of
diversity. Respect for diversity means recognizing that palm trees grow in
some parts of the country and the chinar grows in others. But what has this
to do with the oppression of harijans or adivasis or discrimination against
women? Surely, the ladies of Kerala deserve equal treatment in the
panchayats as the ladies of Kashmir, even as scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes everywhere are entitled to equal representation. Diversity means
respect for a Carnatic kriti in anjavur, a baul in Bengal, a dhrupad in
Gwalior and a manganiar lok geet in Rajasthan. But does this mean
reservations in Tamil Nadu should be different to reservations in Bengal?
Does this mean that the adivasis of Rajasthan should be treated differently
to the adivasis of Madhya Pradesh or that the scheduled castes in one part
of the country should get reservations in proportion to their population but
be denied the same privilege in other parts of the country? To do this would
be to make a farce of the noble precept of unity in diversity.
We celebrate the intellectual, spiritual, and cultural diversity of our country.
But, as I said a minute ago, we are one country. When it comes to
oppression and discrimination, the people of India are united in demanding
a uniform end to all oppression, all suppression, all social tyranny, all
obsolete social morals. I repeat, madam, that it is to secure a uniform system
of reservations that we were obliged to prescribe a uniform structure of local
government.
I now turn to questions of political propriety which appears to have agitated
the feelings of our friends opposite. We have been asked: how dare the
Prime Minister interact directly with district magistrates? I answer: What
call has the Prime Minister of a country like India to remain as Prime
Minister unless he feels at home in the humblest hut of the humblest,
remotest village of our vast and varied country? I toured hundreds of
villages. I spoke to countless people. ere, in their hearths and homes, I
experienced the cruelty of an unresponsive administration, the oppression of
an administration without a heart, the callous lack of compassion that most
of our people find at the hands of much of our administration. I then
looked at the administrators themselves—most of them dedicated young
men and women, of extraordinarily high intelligence, deeply concerned
about the people placed in their charge and yet, apparently incapable of
converting their enthusiasm and personal compassion into a responsive
administration. I sought an answer to this riddle, a solution to this
d  h I d d d h h d
conundrum. at is how I decided to pose the question to the district
magistrates themselves. How could this possibly be wrong?
In any case, there was nothing clandestine about my encounters with
district magistrates. e first one was held at Bhopal. I invited Chief
Minister Motilal Vora, to join us. He accepted and was with us in the
meeting. e second one was at Hyderabad.
I invited Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao to accompany me to the
encounter. For reasons best known to him, he haughtily declined… I asked
him once again at Hyderabad airport. He once again refused to come with
me. How can the Opposition…now turn around and say I went behind the
backs of chief ministers to talk to district magistrates?
When it came to meetings with village pradhans and sarpanches, panchayat
samiti chairmen and presidents of zila parshads, we took care to seek the
cooperation of at least two Opposition-run state governments in holding
these sammelans (meetings). Chief Minister Jyoti Basu kindly agreed to
cooperate and we held a most informative and useful sammelan in Calcutta,
in full view, I might add, of the representatives of that state’s non-Congress
government. We were making arrangements with an Opposition-run
government for the south zone sammelan in Bangalore when that
government crumbled under the weight of its own inconsistencies. If the
Janata Dal failed to host the south zone sammelan that was not on account
of any failing on our part but only because of their own inability to hold out
until the panchayat representatives arrived.
We have consulted openly, frankly and freely with every echelon concerned:
beginning with the common folk of our villages to whom I spoke; then the
bureaucracy, including district magistrates, chief secretaries and secretaries
to the Government of India; and then the panchayat and local selfgovernment
ministers and chief ministers of states. It was never we who
shied away from meeting them. Regrettably, however, some Opposition-run
state governments refused to send officials and even elected representatives
to these encounters and then, in a shameful act of abnegation of
governmental responsibility, failed to participate in the conference of chief
ministers which I called in early July.
We come to this House, madam, at the culmination of a process of open,
transparent consultation without precedent in the history of independent
India. e amendments we present are the distilled essence of the views of
h d f l d l l b d h d d f d
thousands of elected local body representatives, hundreds of district
magistrates, scores of senior government servants and dozens of ministers
and chief ministers. ere is no impropriety on our part. e only
impropriety has lain in the discourtesy with which a well-intentioned
invitation was turned down.
Madam, much play has been made by the Opposition of the proximity of
the forthcoming general elections to the important legislation which this
House will shortly be voting upon. I do not quite understand the point at
issue here. Is it not a fact that we were elected to govern and legislate for a
five-year period?…
Is it not a fact that we were elected to serve the people of their development
and progress for a five-year period? Should we stop governing and
legislating only because elections are in the offing? It is the people who have
given us this responsibility. It is to the people and the people alone—that
we are responsible…. We reject this artful misinterpretation of
parliamentary practice that would require us to desist from legislation
because of the proximity of the polls.
In any case, madam, it was at the very beginning of our present term of
office, in the first broadcast I made to the nation in January 1985 that I
outlined the plan we had in mind to make our administration responsive to
the people’s needs. I raised these issues in my speech at the Congress
centenary in Bombay in December 1985. In August 1986 this intention of
government was enshrined as the twentieth point of the 20-point
programme under the rubric ‘Responsive Administration’.
At that time, I must confess, we were in quest of managerial solutions to an
unresponsive administration. We were looking to a simplification of
procedures, grievance redressal machinery, single-window clearances,
computerization and courtesy as the answers to the problem. As we went
along, we discovered that a managerial solution would not do. What was
needed was a systematic solution.
e Panchayati Raj and Nagarpalika Bills constitute the most signifciant
systemic transformation in the governance of the Indian polity since the
Constitution entered into force just under forty years ago. We learnt that a
paternalistic administration cannot be a responsive administration. We
learnt that a grassroot administration without political authority was like a
meal without salt. We learnt that however well-intentioned our district
b h b h ff l d h h b
bureaucracy might be, without effective elected authority the gap between
the people and the bureaucracy could not be closed. We learnt that the
vacuum created by the absence of local level political authority had spawned
the power brokers who occupy the gap between the people and their
representatives in distant Vidhan Sabhas and the ever more remote
Parliament. We learnt that corruption could only be ended by giving power
to the panchayats and making panchayats responsible to the people. We
learnt that inefficiency could only be ended by entrusting the people at the
grassroot level with the responsibility for their own development. We learnt
that callousness could only be ended by empowering the people to send
their own representatives to institutions of local self-government, by
empowering the people to reject those who betray their mandate.
e Panchayati Raj and Nagarpalika Bills are not only instruments for
bringing democracy and devolution of every chaupal (square) and every
chabutra (pillar), to every angan (verandah) and every dalan, they are also a
charter for ending bureaucratic oppression, technocratic tyranny, crass
inefficiency, bribery, jobbery, nepotism, corruption and the million other
malfeasances that afflict the poor of our villages, towns and cities. e bills
are the warrant for ending the reign of the power brokers, of the
intermediaries whom Shakespeare called ‘the caterpillars of the
commonwealth’.
ese bills fill a yawning gap in the country’s polity. ey are the result of a
process that was started in the immediate aftermath of our great electoral
victory and has been carried forward in carefully considered stages till it has
ripened for consideration by our august houses of Parliament. ere is
nothing sudden or surprising about the timing of these Bills.
ere is another point I would wish to stress. Elections come and go. e
consequences of these constitutional amendments will far outlast the
outcome of the forthcoming general elections. ese amendments will
become a sacred obligation on the governments, whether at the centre or in
the states, whether run by the Congress or by any Opposition party. ere is
nothing gimmicky about our intentions. We are making democracy at the
grassroots a solemn and ineluctable constitutional obligation. Equally, we
are making the devolution of administrative and financial powers to the
local bodies an inescapable responsibility of all governments, now and in the
future, here at the centre and there in the states, a responsibility as much of
C f b h A l
Congress run governments as of governments run by others. An election
gimmick is a trick of the trade. A constitutional amendment is a solemn,
long-term pledge, ours is a pledge to the people. ose who thwart the
people do so at grave risk to themselves. When the voter stands in the
seclusion of the voting booth, his hand will go down on the hand which
clasps his as a friend.
With your permission madam, I would now like to deal with some of the
matters of detail touched upon by participants in this debate.
It has been alleged that Schedules eleven and twelve infringe in some
manner upon the legislative sovereignty of the state legislatures and the
freedom of action of state governments in regard to responsibilities assigned
to them by the constitution. e confusion appears to arise out of
confounding the legislative lists of schedule seven and the lists incorporated
in the proposed schedules eleven and twelve. e Union, State, and
Concurrent Lists detailed in schedule seven deal with the respective
legislative competence of the union, the states, and the union and the states
together. Schedules eleven and twelve on the other hand constitute an
illustrative list of subjects in respect to which development programmes
might be implemented by panchayats and nagarpalikas respectively. ese
are subjects regarding which understanding at the local level is likely to be
much more profound at that level than in some distant state capital and
where implementation by local elected bodies is likely to be much more
responsive to articulated public need than the cold administrations of
official agencies.
Schedules eleven and twelve do not confer any legislative competence upon
the local bodies. Nothing is taken away from the legislative competence of
state legislatures. All that is indicated by these schedules is the path along
which effective devolution might be pursued to render the panchayats and
nagarpalikas into vibrant, dynamic, meaningful institutions of local selfgovernment.
It is explicitly stated in the constitutional amendments now
before the House that it would be for the state legislatures to lay down the
legislative parameters of devolution and for state governments to give
practical effect to these parameters. We recognize that the precise pattern of
devolution might vary from state to state. We leave it to the good sense of
our people to endorse or reject through their vote the degree and nature of
devolution conferred upon the panchayats and nagarpalikas by different
l l d  h l
state legislatures and state governments. ose state governments that live
up to the expectations of the people will receive the endorsement of the
people. ose who fail the people will receive the rejection they deserve.
Our sanction is the people’s vote. e only threat we hold out to state
governments is the threat of their being rejected at the polls by the people
whose constitutional rights they transgress, by the people who feel deprived
of the opportunities given to them by constitutional amendments.
Surprisingly, little has been said in this debate about the heart of the
amendments, which is the provisions of planning and implementation. It is
undeniable that our planning has become increasingly removed from the
perceptions and aspirations of our people at the grassroots. Such district
planning as is taking place is largely formalistic in nature, a putting together
by bureaucrats and technocrats of what they perceive to be in the interests
of the people. e people themselves are not consulted at all, or are
consulted but perfunctorily. rough these amendments, the primary
responsibility for planning would devolve upon the panchayats at every
level, and each tier of the nagarpalikas. Each local community, whether in a
small village covered by a village panchayat or in a village turning into a
town governed by a nagar panchayat, or in a town governed by the
municipal councillor in a city governed by a corporation would prepare its
own plan for its own development. I would particularly draw the attention
of the House to the wording of the relevant provision. It provides in effect
for any plan for economic development to incorporate its social justice
component. As it is, the provision for reservation ensures that the panchayat
and the nagarpalika undertaking the planning exercise will be adequately
weighed with the weaker sections of society. at in itself will contribute to
a heightened social consciousness in the preparation of plans. But these
constitutional provisions go even further. ey make the completion of any
plan prepared by a panchayat or a nagarpalika contingent upon the
incorporation in the plan of its social justice component. In other words,
whereas up till now, even in so progressive a state as Gujarat, which has
pioneered the social justice committees in panchayats, social justice has been
an adjunct to the planning process. ese constitutional amendments make
social justice an integral element of the planning process. Plans prepared by
panchayats, panchayat samitis and nagarpalikas will then be filtered
upwards to the zila parishads for harmonizing and consolidation by a
committee elected by the members of the zila parishads and the
l k  f d l b f
nagarpalikas. is committee for district planning incorporates members of
the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in proportion to their population
in the district and reserves thirty percent of the seats for women. us the
very composition of the district planning committee is such as to ensure the
integration of social justice with economic planning in district plans. is
holds true equally of the elected body being established for metropolitan
planning. ese constitutional amendments presage an entirely new era in
planning not only in terms of detailed consultations at the grassroots but
also in terms of ensuring social justice as an integral component of the
development process. As regards implementation, there has been a halfhearted
attempt by some members of the Opposition to raise an alarm by
pointing to one lacuna or the other in the eleventh and the twelfth
schedule. ese digs would have a purpose if there had been any attempt to
make these schedules either comprehensive or obligatory. We have made it
amply clear that these two schedules are illustrative in nature aimed at
indicating practical ways in which the implementation of the programmes
and projects might be entrusted to elected local bodies, instead of being
carried out as at present by cold, remote official agencies. It is by being held
responsible for the implementation of programmes that local bodies will
become truly responsible to the people. It is when representativeness is
combined with responsibility that responsive administration follows.
Moreover, the location of the district planning committee in the zila
parishad and indeed its very creation provides the first ever platform of
rural-urban interaction of developmental issues. is in itself will contribute
to a higher awareness of various problems of social injustice and the
remedial measures required to rectify them. rough the proposed
metropolitan planning authority, India becomes one of the first developing
countries in the world to provide a platform for interaction between state
and central authorities and the elected representative of urban and adjacent
rural local bodies, thus integrating the demands of social justice with the
imperatives of economic growth. We have left it to state legislatures and
state governments to determine the precise contours of the responsibility
that will devolve on local bodies for the implementation of programmes.
Some states will go further than others. Some variations in the degree and
pattern of devolution would be justified and acceptable. But any state
government which transgresses the spirit of these amendments will have to
face the wrath of the people. We at the Centre have made a beginning in
h l l b d l h  J h
trusting the local bodies to implement their own programmes. e Jawahar
Rozgar Yojna and the Nehru Rozgar Yojna are the earnest of our
commitment of placing responsibility for development administration
squarely in the hands of the elected representatives of the people at the
grassroots. No longer will the people have to run from one bureaucratic
closed door to another, from one indifferent official to another. No longer
will they have to bribe and cajole their way to securing their legitimate
rights. We are bringing to an end the Kafkaesque nightmare through which
the people at the grassroots have lived. eir problems will now be solved at
their doorsteps. Answerability will be within the very villages where they
live. Accountability would be nailed to the panchayat ghar and the
nagarpalika. Truth will not be hidden in ever more voluminous files and
cupboards bursting at the seams but will be revealed on the floor of the
panchayat ghar and at the village hustings, on the floor of the town hall and
the hustings in every mohalla (area).
As regards the sound finances of the panchayats and nagar-palikas, we
propose entrusting this responsibility to the finance commissions envisaged
in the constitutional amendment. Here again, some of the comments made
by members opposite would appear to indicate that while they have
glimpsed some of the parallel features between the Finance Commission
established under Article 280 of the Constitution and the finance
commissions proposed in the present amendment, they have not
comprehended the essential differences between the two. Whereas the
Finance Commission established under Article 280 affects the actual
allocation of resources between the Centre and the states, the finance
commissions referred to in this amendment would limit themselves to the
principles on the basis of which allocation might be made between the
states and the local bodies. e actual allocations will be made by the state
governments in the light of state legislation on the subject and the
principles recommended by the finance commissions.
We at the Centre are undertaking an exercise to review nagarpalika and
panchayat finances with a view to seeing what steps might be taken to
augment the availability of financial resources for local self-government. We
would hope, the state governments, both those run by our party and those
run by the Opposition parties would undertake a similar exercise in selfenlightenment.
 l d h ll d d
e constitutional amendment entrusts to the comptroller and auditorgeneral
the responsibility for causing the accounts of the local bodies to be
prepared and audited in such manner as he deems fit. Members opposite
appear to have jumped to the conclusion that this means dismantling the
existing state machinery for the examination and auditing of local bodies’
accounts. In our view, unless the CAG in his wisdom deems otherwise,
there would be no need to dismantle the existing state machinery, nor
undertake any substantial augmentation of the staff in the CAG’s office.
What the CAG is being asked, being mandated to do, is to examine
existing procedures in different states for the preparation and audit of local
bodies’ accounts and prescribe methods by which such accounts and
auditing might be made stricter and less prone to abuse. ere is no
question of requiring the CAG to himself take over the direct responsibility
for accounting and auditing. e state local fund auditing bodies would
continue to exercise their functions but under the overall guidance and
direction of the comptroller and auditor-general.
I now turn to the dust being raised by the Opposition over the role of the
Election Commission. Here again, it is a total misreading of the
constitutional amendment to suggest that the existing machinery for the
conduct of elections of local bodies would have to be dismantled. e
Election Commissioner will conduct the elections through the state
electoral officers and their staff. Also, as elections are going to be regular,
and arbitrarily prolonged suspensions are to be outlawed, it would be
essential to further strengthen the existing machinery. e important
change we are effecting is not in centralizing the conduct of elections but in
bringing the process of elections to the local bodies under the purview of
the Election Commission.
In recent months the burden of responsibility on the Election Commission
has been considerably increased. Legislative amendments undertaken in
respect of the Representation of the People Act and other legislations have
greatly added to the workload of the commission. e responsibilities
envisaged for them under the Panchayati Raj and the Nagarpalika Bills will
further increase the Chief Election Commissioner’s responsibilities.
Mr Chairman, Sir, we seek no confrontation on these Bills. In preparing
these Bills we have drawn upon the experience of all Congress states as
much as of non-Congress states. We have freely and repeatedly
k l d d d b O l k h W
acknowledged our debt to Opposition governments like those in West
Bengal and Andhra Pradesh and the earlier Janata government in
Karnataka who have made innovative contributions to the improvement of
Panchayati Raj in our country… Equally do we owe a debt of gratitude to
the pioneering Congress stalwarts in Gujarat and Maharashtra who have
the longest, unbroken and unblemished record of Panchayati Raj in the
country. ere are negative lessons, too, to be learnt, as we have freely and
fully admitted, from inadequate or insufficient Panchayati Raj and
Nagarpalika Administration in some non-Congress as well as in some
Congress states. ere is no partisan politics in this. Our only interest is the
national interest—the interest of development, the interest of the poor, the
interest of the weak. We admit also that the objectives we seek to achieve
are objectives, which at various times in the past have been espoused by
Opposition parties ranging all across the spectrum, from the Bharatiya
Janata Party and its forebears to the two Communist parties and their
forebears. We invite all the parties in the House to join hands with us in
passing these Bills.
e Bills are for the people. e Bills are for their welfare, their benefit. e
Bills are to give power in the hands of the people. e Bills are to end the
reign of power brokers. e Bills are to entrust responsibility to the
grassroots. e Bills are to give representative administration. e Bills are
to involve the people’s participation in planning and implementation in
development and social justice. e Bills are designed to entrench
democracy in the very foundations of our polity so that the superstructure of
democracy in state capitals, and the national capital might be stable, sound,
well-founded. e Bills represent the realization of Mahatma Gandhi’s
vision. e Bills represent the fulfilment of Pandit Jawaharlal’s dreams. e
Bills are the outgrowth of Indiraji’s endeavours. Sir, I invite the House to
pass these Bills unanimously. ose who support these Bills will earn the
people’s gratitude. ose who oppose these Bills will fail the people and live
to rue their lapse.
Mr Chairman, I commend to this House, the Constitution (Sixtyfourth
Amendment) Bill, 1989 and the Constitution (Sixty-fifth Amendment)
Bill, 1989.
ank you, Sir.